



Module 4

Understanding and planning under uncertainty

Training workshops on
mainstreaming climate change


Sources of uncertainty

Socio-economic uncertainties



- **Socio-economic uncertainties** (e.g. related to future population growth, economic growth, technological choices, societal choices, international relations):
 - influence the level of future emissions and thus the magnitude of climate change
 - also, create uncertainties about future vulnerability to climate change

IPCC GHG emission scenarios



Source: IPCC (2007a) 4th Assessment report – Synthesis report, Fig. 3.1

Climate uncertainties



- For any given emission scenario, different atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) provide different projections of future change – sometimes very different ones
- Due to the complexity of the climate system, many uncertainties prevail and will persist over the evolution of climate

Uncertainties in climate change projections



- Temperatures and sea levels:
 - consensus that they will increase
 - magnitude of the increase quite uncertain
- Rainfall:
 - expected to increase overall
 - but some regions are likely to get more and some less
 - for many regions in the world, uncertainty about the direction of change
- Changes in extreme parameters:
 - average future conditions are easier to project than extremes

Problems associated with downscaling



- AOGCMs produce projections of future climate change for large areas (e.g. 200x200 km) – but used alone, do not allow the downscaling of projections to local and regional scales (e.g. 10x10 km, 100x100 km)
- Downscaling requires extra data and efforts
 - In developing countries, the data needed to downscale projections of climate change to the local or regional level are often missing
 - The level of uncertainty is greater at downscaled levels than at large scales

Planning in the face of uncertainties

The cost of inaction



- The uncertainties surrounding climate change are often invoked to justify inaction
- In a medium- to long-term perspective, however, inaction now is likely to be more costly:

Failure to adapt

- *Wasted investment
- *Increased vulnerability

Failure to reduce emissions

- *More harmful impacts
- *Higher adaptation costs

The benefits of action



- Some climate adaptation and mitigation measures are expected to provide developmental benefits, regardless of the scope and magnitude of climate change or, as far as mitigation is concerned, regardless of carbon prices
- Even in the face of uncertainty, some types of measures are justified

Justified measures in the face of uncertainty (1)



- ‘No-regret’ measures:
 - those expected to produce net benefits for society even in the absence of climate change (adaptation) or independently of any ‘reward’ for mitigation (zero or negative net cost at a zero carbon price)
- ‘Low-regret’ measures:
 - those expected to have a cost for society, but an acceptable one in view of the benefits they would bring if climate change turns out to produce significant effects (adaptation), or to have a low net cost at zero or low carbon prices (mitigation)

Justified measures in the face of uncertainty (2)



- ‘Robust’ measures:
 - those that produce net benefits or deliver good outcomes across various possible climate change or carbon price scenarios and economic development scenarios (rather than just under the ‘most likely’ scenario)

Adaptive management



- **Adaptive management:** a flexible and pragmatic type of management, aimed at continually improving management policies and practices, on the basis of ‘learning by doing’
 - Uses pilot projects and experiments; results and outcomes are analysed and lessons learnt before scaling up or adjusting responses
 - Involves robustness as a decision criterion, the inclusion of safety margins in investment and the choice of reversible/flexible options
- Well suited to situations involving uncertainties

Scenario-based planning (1)



- To support the choice of adaptation measures, **scenarios** reflecting prevailing uncertainties can also be developed, e.g.

- 1) No change
- 2) Moderate change
- 3) High change

- 1) No change
- 2) Temperatures up, rainfall up
- 3) Temperatures up, rainfall down

Scenario-based planning (2)



Contents of scenarios

Changes in climate conditions

Resulting biophysical effects

Resulting socio-economic impacts

Scenario development

Key experts with a range of technical skills

Other national stakeholders for their knowledge of local conditions (e.g. government and civil society organisations)

Scenario-based planning (3)



Once scenarios have been designed:

1) Identify potentially suitable adaptation or mitigation options


2) Calculate costs and benefits for each chosen scenarios

3) Compare costs and benefits across the various scenarios

4) Identify no-regret, low-regret and robust options/measures

Use of scenarios: Samoa case study (1)

Exhibit 1 – Scenarios for long-term sea level rise in Samoa; in the high change case, sea level might rise by up to ~26cm by 2030




SOURCES: IPCC 4th AR; Rahmstorf (2009); CSIRO; team analysis

Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation (2009) *Test case on Samoa – Focus on risks caused by sea level rise*, Fig. 01, p. 121

Use of scenarios: Samoa case study (2)

Exhibit 2 – The freshwater lens is expected to retract by ~ 30 meters in Upolu and ~10 meters in Savai'i by 2030



SOURCE: Team analysis; CMIP3 global models

Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation (2009) *Test case on Samoa – Focus on risks caused by sea level rise*, Fig. 02, p. 122

References



- Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group (2009) *Shaping climate-resilient development: a framework for decision-making*. Climate Works Foundation, Global Environment Facility, European Commission, McKinsey & Company, The Rockefeller Foundation, Standard Chartered Bank & Swiss Re. Available from: http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/Social_Sector/our_practices/Economic_Development/Knowledge_Highlights/Economics_of_climate_adaptation.aspx
- IPCC (2007a) *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report*. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report. [Core Writing Team, Pachaury R.K. & Reisinger A. (eds.)] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva. Available from: www.ipcc.ch